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Justin Murray, Meredith Esser and Robin West

This collection of chapters stems from a symposium that was held at the
Georgetown University Law Center in the fall of 2009. Originally titled “A New
Abortion Debate,” the goal of the symposium was to bring together pro-choice
and pro-life scholars in an effort to explore the common philosophical, moral, or
political ground that might be shared by these groups who so rarely come together,
and more generally to support new and emerging scholarship that is self-reflective
on the issue of abortion. The symposium included scholars working on common
ground policy or philosophical scholarship, as well as other voices seeking to
broaden the scope of the abortion debate to non-legal and non-constitutional
themes. This collection includes work from some of the scholars who participated
in the symposium, as well as new work from others, but the themes remain
the same. Taken collectively, the chapters explore the possibilities for cultural,
philosophical, moral, and political common ground on the subjects of abortion and
reproductive justice more generally.
The position of the three editors is that any common ground project such as
this one in this contentious area must emerge from joint reflection and genuine
collaboration among persons who harbor diverse perspectives concerning the
subjects that divide us. In this spirit, rather than attempting to sum up the quest
for commonality in a unitary voice, each of the three editors has individually
composed some brief reflections on central concepts that recur throughout the
chapters of this book. Those individual editors’ introductions appear immediately
below; first Justin Murray’s, then Meredith Esser’s, then Robin West’s. Following
that set of comments, we then briefly summarize the chapters.
Editors’ Introductions
Comments from Justin Murray
Since the middle of the twentieth century, many Americans have begun to
dramatically rethink traditional views about women’s place in society, the
appropriate link between sex and reproduction, and the moral stature of unborn
human life. As a result, many social practices that were once unthinkable are now
familiar features of American life. Women work side-by-side with men in virtually
every sector of the economy. The vast majority of sexually active Americans use
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some form of contraception at least some of the time. Unmarried couples routinely
live together in preparation for, or even as a permanent substitute for, marriage.
And every year, approximately one million pregnancies are terminated by abortion.
These momentous social developments are not, however, backed by a settled
moral consensus. Far from it. Indeed, a prominent social movement—the Moral
Majority—came into being for the expressed purpose of turning back the clock
on the sexual revolution. Ever since these battle lines were drawn, presidents
have been elected, Supreme Court Justices appointed, and wealthy businesses
imperiled, based largely on their views about sex and abortion. Public dialogue
between representatives of the opposing viewpoints has been largely acrimonious
and uncomprehending, leading many observers to characterize it as a culture war.
Whether we like it or not, countless politicians, religious leaders, and
influential media figures ceaselessly seek to re-enlist us as participants in a culture
war against our fellow citizens. The 2012 presidential election, which was in
full swing when I first composed this introduction, offered no reprieve from this
drumbeat. The leading Republican presidential aspirants accused President Obama
of orchestrating a “war on the Catholic Church” (Rick Santorum) and even a fullblown “war on religion” (Mitt Romney). Not to be outdone, a chorus of liberal
columnists denounced the GOP’s purported “war on women,” and Vice President
Biden added his voice to their accusation. These bipartisan invocations of warfare
as a metaphorical description of our social predicament are nothing new; they are
simply the most recent iterations of a long-standing pattern that has endured for
the better part of the last century.
Some might be tempted to dismiss these exchanges as empty posturing or
politics-as-usual, but that response would be a mistake. In a heterogeneous society
such as ours, disagreement among citizens is par for the course, and most of these
disagreements can be addressed more or less effectively through the conventional
problem-solving mechanisms of democratic politics: tolerance for opposing
viewpoints, mutual efforts at persuasion, coalition politics, and (when necessary)
compromise. None of these tools for achieving political consensus are available,
however, when opinion leaders on both sides of a dispute habitually characterize
their disagreements as though they were episodes in a protracted military struggle.
Language drives our perception of reality and, by extension, our conduct. A dispute
that has been framed as a war will be handled through the typical instruments
of warfare: propaganda, exaggeration or outright distortion of relevant facts,
vilification of outsiders, zero-sum decision-making, and the single-minded pursuit
of victory at any price. Each and every one of these warlike dynamics is on full
display in our contemporary culture war.
The divisiveness of current conversations about abortion derives, in large
measure, from the narrow range of problems and proposals that have come to
dominate the discussion. Public debate has revolved almost entirely around the
two issues that most sharply pit the pro-life and pro-choice camps against one
another: legal restrictions designed to impede access to abortion, on the one hand,
and public funding to facilitate access to abortion, on the other. On these subjects,
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policymaking has an unavoidably zero-sum character: the law can either enhance
the freedom of women to opt for abortion (through minimal restrictions and
maximal funding), or protect fetal life against abortion (through the opposite mix
of restrictions and funding), but never both. Because one of these objectives must
be sacrificed for the other to prevail, principled compromise is difficult—perhaps
impossible—to achieve. Thus, a national discourse fixated primarily on these
themes will almost inevitably be a combative and unaccommodating one.
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine, and work to achieve, a different kind
of conversation about abortion that extends beyond the issues of legal prohibition
and public funding. For culture war veterans of all stripes, this possibility might
initially seem dangerous or fanciful. Understandably so: all too often, partisans on
both sides who call for common ground on abortion insist that their adversaries
dilute their central moral convictions and political goals as a precondition
for dialogue.
That is not the kind of conversation we have in mind. Rather than urging either
of the contenders to abandon its core ideals, we envision a discussion that calls upon
both sides to reflect more deeply and broadly on the meaning of their respective
ideals. We are confident that sustained exploration of the fundamental principles
that underlie the pro-life and pro-choice positions on sex, pregnancy, and abortion
will uncover promising opportunities for common ground—opportunities that
have been obscured by the deafening background noise of culture-war politics.
Beginning with my own philosophical orientation, I believe that the
foundational ethical norms that animate the pro-life movement—at least in its
finer moments—are the profound dignity of human life and a commitment to
care for those who are most vulnerable and dependent on others. Taking these
principles seriously certainly means taking meaningful steps to diminish the rate
of abortion—including, in my view, legal restrictions on abortion—because few
human lives are more vulnerable, dependent, and in need of care than developing
children within the womb. But the very same principles the pro-life movement
invokes to restrict abortion should lead it to support progressive measures to
counteract the many social and economic obstacles that imperil the vulnerability
of many pregnant women, parents, and their children—especially when those
obstacles generate pressure upon women to consider abortion.
Similarly, the central concerns that motivate the pro-choice
movement—enhancing women’s health, autonomy, and life opportunities—cannot
be set right merely by preserving the formal right to end a pregnancy. As my coeditors and several contributors to this book eloquently explain, a sound agenda for
promoting reproductive justice must focus more broadly on expanding the safety
net for pregnant women and mothers, thus ensuring that abortion is truly a choice
and not a default dictated by economic necessity. Within these expanded parameters
for discussion, we believe that it is possible for former enemies in the abortion
debate to form mutually advantageous coalitions on highly significant social and
political issues, even as they continue to struggle over the more intractable—and,
of course, important—topics of abortion prohibition and funding.
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Recent years have brought several positive signs of a shift in tone and
priorities, but much more remains to be done. Many pro-life organizations have
become ardent advocates for, and direct providers of, social support and healthcare
to pregnant women and young mothers. Legislators from both parties have begun
to explore authentic common ground measures, such as the Pregnant Women
Support Act spearheaded by Democrats for Life of America. And during the
early months of his presidency, President Obama struck a conciliatory note in his
commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, laying groundwork for
national reflection on how pro-choice and pro-life groups might work together to
reduce abortion and honor the dignity of pregnant women and their children.
Nevertheless, old habits die hard, and it remains to be seen whether these
developments prove to be durable or successful. Pro-life healthcare organizations
have been widely criticized by pro-choice activists and health providers for
allegedly deceiving their patients about the nature of their services and delivering
incomplete, inadequate medical care. Media discussions and legislative agendas
relating to abortion continue, by and large, to operate within the traditional
restrict-or-fund paradigm, overlooking the broader socioeconomic context in
which men and women make decisions about sex, pregnancy, and parenting. And,
as I noted toward the beginning of these remarks, the lofty appeals to tolerance,
collaboration, and common ground with which President Obama began his term
have largely given way to mutual recriminations and culture-war rhetoric on both
sides of the partisan divide.
All things considered, the future outlook of the half-century-long culture war
is anyone’s guess. The upshot is that the future lies in our hands. We hope that
this book will supply ideas and energy to those who are working to transform the
breadth, content, and civility of this important national dialogue.
Comments from Meredith Esser
Over the past decade, the pro-choice movement has undergone an important
rhetorical shift from talking about reproductive “rights” to using the more expansive
term, reproductive “justice” to describe the movement’s central goal. The concept of
reproductive justice aims to describe women’s reproductive health as connected to
and affected by conditions that are much broader than just the decision to terminate
a pregnancy. Women’s lives are shaped by their socioeconomic status, religious
views, race, sexuality, nationality, family life, geography, level of education, and
other factors that—until recently—the reproductive rights movement had failed to
fully conceptualize when developing a political agenda.
Legal scholars have been slow in adopting this framework, preferring to stick to
the rights-based language that is so central to the legal field in general. At first blush,
this rhetorical distinction—between “rights” and “justice”—may seem indicative
of merely a semantic trend rather than a true ideological change. However, I would
argue that this shift within the reproductive rights field is actually a reaction to
the polarization that a younger generation of women (and men) involved in these
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issues has grown up with, and that the adoption of the phrase “reproductive justice”
is an attempt to describe a viewpoint that is often buried by the polarized rhetoric
of the abortion debate in general: the way that these issues affect real people,
every day. Indeed, as we are beginning to understand, “rights” don’t always make
sense in this context. At the same time, the “justice” in the phrase “reproductive
justice” means something very different from the court-centric notions of justice.
It encompasses a wide range of issues and values such as access to health services,
racial justice, socioeconomic justice, and all of the potential barriers to obtaining
not just abortion and reproductive services, but education, contraception, and the
basic tools that women should have at their disposal for controlling not just their
reproductive lives, but their entire lives.
In my view, the reproductive justice movement should also embrace a
“common ground” approach to understanding women’s experiences of and
surrounding abortion—if not always to the fundamental rights and prohibitions
that each political stance embraces. To that end, part of my personal motivation
in embarking on this project was to give a voice to the stifled middle ground—if
not undertake the daunting task of finding a common ground—on the issue of
reproduction and abortion. For example, many women who self-identify as “prolife” still believe that women should be allowed to abort in the case of rape. On
the other side, many individuals who call themselves “pro-choice” agree that lateterm abortion is a morally grey area.
So much of the way that political activists talk about abortion and reproduction
is divorced from the stories of real individuals; the rhetoric is couched in absolute
terms with neither side wanting to cede any “ground” to the other. For example, on
the pro-life side, moral arguments against abortion are reduced to abstractions that
are difficult for ordinary, non-scientists to grasp, but which nonetheless form the
foundation of the fundamental objections to abortion: life begins at conception;
human life is sacred; ergo the “morning-after pill” is abortion. On the pro-choice
side, the autonomy of woman is paramount, bodily integrity and boundless
reproductive freedom must be maintained, ergo late-term abortions should be
approached with the same detached attitude as taking the pill or going in for a
routine checkup.
In reality, however, neither one of these extremes describes the vast middle
ground in which most Americans exist on the spectrum of this debate. Similarly,
neither of these arguments captures the moral balancing that women undergo
when actually facing the prospect of taking the morning-after pill, or obtaining
abortion services. In conversations with friends and colleagues about this project,
I have heard a wide range of views on abortion, but very few people actually
identify with the extreme pro-choice or the extreme pro-life positions. However,
such middle-ground views are—more often than not—eclipsed by the extreme
positions that have become the white noise of politics.
At the same time, however, each side employs certain stories—myths—to
advance their political agendas. Indeed, while women’s real experiences are
suppressed, imagined experiences of women have become rhetorical weapons.
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For example the mythical woman who aborts and then “comes to regret her
choice,” was a central figure in the Supreme Court decision, Gonzales v. Carhart,1
and served as a primary justification in that opinion for restricting access to
certain kinds of abortion procedures. In justifying its decision, the dissent wrote,
“the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no
reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices,
and consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.’”2 As the
dissent in that case pointed out, rather than implement policies that educate or
inform women regarding the controversial partial-birth abortion procedure, the
court took a paternalistic and protective stance, choosing instead to justify its
decision on the ground that women were incapable of making that decision with
sound mind, and equally incapable of dealing with the consequences.3
The uncomfortable implication of this story is that women are unable to fully
appreciate the emotional impact of such a decision.4 But the pro-choice reaction
to this story may also be overly-simplistic: the pro-choice camp can equally stifle
the voices of women for whom regret, remorse, and true sorrow is an inevitable
part of abortion.
For example, post-abortion counseling service providers are caught in the
middle of this debate, and though they provide a valued and necessary service, are
vilified by both movements. Aspen Baker, one of the participants in our symposium
and the founder of Exhale, a post-abortion counseling hotline based in Oakland,
California, explained that “[s]ome people have characterized us as pro-choice;
some people have characterized us as pro-life; some people have characterized us
as confusing, or as wishy-washy … [i]n a pro-choice/pro-life world — in a blackand-white world — we’re trying to say there’s something else.”5 Thus the woman
“who regrets her choice” is at once turned into a tool of pro-life paternalism, and
is simultaneously silenced by pro-choice extremism, but has few places to turn
for support.
In so many ways, the gorilla in the room (or standing on the steps of the
Supreme Court)—with the pro-life protesters on one side and pro-choice protesters
on the other—is sex. Sex is an integral part of this debate, but is rarely discussed
in legal and academic discourses on abortion. And attitudes about sex come with
its own set of stereotypes and myths. On the one hand, pro-choice activists are
viewed as advancing a culture in which unbounded sexual freedom—with no
consequences—is the norm. Pro-life activists, on the other hand, are viewed as
1 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1649 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
4 See generally, Reva B. Segal, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008).
5 Shoshanna Walker, Post-Abortion Counseling Group Finds Itself on the Firing
Line, N.Y. Times, January 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/us/14bcexhale.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

West, R, Murray, J, & Esser, M (eds) 2014, In Search of Common Ground on Abortion : From Culture War to
Reproductive Justice, Taylor & Francis Group, Farnham. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [6 November 2020].
Created from nyls on 2020-11-06 13:41:24.

Introduction

7

advancing a worldview in which sex should be restricted and the consequences
of sex—wanted or unwanted—should be borne by the women and girls, men and
boys who engage in it.
Few exchanges so poignantly highlight this division as the recent controversy
involving one of our Georgetown Law colleagues, Sandra Fluke, and a prominent
talk radio personality, Rush Limbaugh. The actual transcript of Limbaugh’s words
illustrate the polarized nature of political rhetoric around sex:
What does it say about the college co-ed Susan Fluke [sic], who goes before a
congressional committee and essentially says that she must be paid to have sex,
what does that make her? It makes her a slut, right?

Copyright © 2014. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

It makes her a prostitute. She wants to be paid to have sex. She’s having so
much sex she can’t afford the contraception. She wants you and me and the
taxpayers to pay her to have sex. What does that make us? We’re the pimps …
So, Ms. Fluke and the rest of you feminazis, here’s the deal. If we are going
to pay for your contraceptives, and thus pay for you to have sex, we want
something for it, and I’ll tell you what it is. We want you to post the videos
online so we can all watch.6

There are so many tragedies that this transcript illustrates. The first is that, for
women, there is no sexual middle ground—either you are not having sex at all, or
you are a prostitute. In this political climate, an accomplished and highly educated
law student—who publicly admits that she is sexually active—is “a woman who
is happily presenting herself as an immoral, baseless, no-purpose-to-her life
woman.” Another is that this public figure—followed by so many Americans—is
actually completely ignorant of the pure-and-simple biology of birth control pills
(“Ms. Fluke, have you ever heard of not having sex? Have you ever heard of not
having sex so often? … did you ever think about maybe backing off the amount of
sex that you have?”). Finally, it is tragic that the base and divisive language used
to describe Ms. Fluke dehumanizes, demonizes, and “archetypizes” women (and
men) who do not fit into one of two very polarized political groups—so much so
that the space between the two “camps” becomes a “no-woman’s land.”
The link between sexual extremism and political extremism thus leads to
another source of potential “common ground” regarding abortion: reforming the
political rhetoric around sex. Is there room for a common ground conversation
about how we talk about sex in the political arena? Surely—with sex an integral
6 See, Jack Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right To
Speak At Contraception Hearing, A “Slut”, The Huffington Post, February 20, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut_n_1311640.
html; J. Bryan Lowder, Has Rush Limbaugh Finally Gone Too Far in Slut-Shaming Sandra
Fluke?, Slate.com, March 2, 2012, http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2012/03/02/has_
rush_limbaugh_finally_gone_too_far_in_slut_shaming_sandra_fluke_.html.
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part of personhood, and an essential prerequisite to abortion—there is a way to
talk about the consequences of sex, the pure-and-simple biology of sex—without
resorting to base and unhelpful stereotypes that only further serve to stifle the
helpful conversations that we could be having.
Just as the polarization of the abortion debate serves to cut women out of the
political conversation about approaches to abortion, adoption and birth control,
the repressive nature of the political rhetoric surrounding sex has caused an
equally problematic gap. Just as the middle-ground voices and perspectives on
the debate are being shut out, there is also an entire piece of the abortion story
that is entirely missing from the political conversation. How did this woman
become unintentionally pregnant? Was it lack of education about her reproductive
cycle? Was it lack of family support? Was there sex-based violence or coercion
involved? Was there social pressure to engage in sex or become pregnant? Or was
it something less concrete—just an inability or unwillingness to say “no”?
All of this leads back to the idea of reproductive justice. What does this term
mean in relation to attitudes toward sex in particular? As I mentioned above, many
women feel conflicted about the decision to undergo an abortion. Many women
feel conflicted about talking about sex. “Reproductive justice” may thus be best
served not by silencing these perspectives, but by supporting the organizations
and individuals who seek to bring these conversations to the forefront of the
national debate.

Copyright © 2014. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

Comments from Robin West
What is meant by “common ground,” and is there any, in the recently intensified
abortion wars?
The questions are related: whether there is any common ground might depend
on what we mean by the phrase. The self-labeled search for “common ground”
between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” advocates in the abortion debates goes back
at least to the mid-1980s, when activists on both sides began to worry about the
corrosive effects of this issue on both politics generally, and politics surrounding
reproductive justice more particularly.7 Since that time, for some activists, and
for some purposes, the search for common ground denotes the attempt to find
those areas of agreement on the morality or legality of abortion, and the morality,
wisdom, and constitutionality of anti-abortion laws. From that common ground,
the hope holds, we might reason our way together toward the best resolution of
these difficult moral and legal problems. For example, most activists and scholars
on both sides of these debates might agree that performing or procuring an abortion
to save the life of the mother is generally morally justified, and all or most might
agree that multiple abortions sought by a woman who has access to birth control
7 For a history of common ground efforts during the decade following Roe v. Wade,
see Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v
Wade, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 571 (2012).
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but finds it inconvenient to use, raise serious moral questions. All or most might
agree on the immorality of late-term abortions for anything other than a very few
reasons, and likewise agree that a law that criminalizes the use of at least some
birth control methods, whatever the morality of the practice, violates constitutional
norms of privacy and liberty. Likewise, all or most might agree on the wrongness
of infanticide, and that the inclusion of intentional killings of newborns in a state’s
homicide statutes bear no constitutional infirmities.
From these shared premises, it is not unreasonable to think, it might be possible
to reason one’s way, either in law or morality, toward conclusions that are not
shared but should be and would be, were the lines of argumentation made clear:
if we all agree that abortion to save the life of the mother is generally morally
justified, then perhaps all or most might agree on the morality of abortions to
prevent grave bodily harm. If we all agree that abortions procured because of a
too casual failure to prevent conception are immoral, perhaps all might agree that
abortions procured so as to forestall or prevent other inconveniences likewise are
immoral (whether or not they should be criminalized, and whether or not it would
be unconstitutional to try to do so). If all agree that the criminalization of some
forms of birth control is a fool’s errand, and unconstitutional to boot, perhaps all
would likewise agree that the same is true of other forms of birth control.
“Common ground” in this understanding refers to initial common premises
which might be shared by both sides of the abortion wars. The “common
ground project,” then, refers to the hope that both sides might reason together
toward common conclusions on more contentious issues regarding the morality
of abortion, and the wisdom or constitutionality of criminalizing it, rather than
resolve them through methods more suited for irreconcilable differences, such
as the blunt political tool of the ballot box, or self-segregation into separate and
gated communities.
Understood in this way, the “common ground” project has a prestigious and
important lineage; it is basically the same method, with the same hope, behind the
academic disciplines of applied ethics, moral philosophy, and normative political
theory. Practitioners in those fields likewise begin with what they hope are shared
premises, and then argue on that basis toward surprising conclusions on contentious
issues, all on the heroic assumption that if the argumentation is sound, listeners
who accept the premises will accept the conclusions, even if those conclusions
are at odds with what their beliefs had been before encountering the argument.
Unsurprisingly, then, moral and political philosophers have responded to the
abortion debates in just this way. Perhaps most famously, Judith Thomson argued
in an important article in the early 1970s8 for the moral permissibility of some
abortions by analogizing the predicament of a woman who has been impregnated
against her will, to that of a hypothetical individual, kidnapped and strapped to a
hospital bed for nine months, so that his body and its organs might service those
of a stranger, threatened by some fatal disease for which the kidnapped victim’s

8 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47 (1971).
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organs might provide an antidote, with no harm done the latter save the ninemonth confinement. Perhaps, Thomson apparently believed, if we all agreed that
the kidnapped victim would be morally justified in severing the lines between
them and attempting an escape, even if it meant the death of the sick beneficiary,
then we all might agree likewise on the moral permissibility of abortion, at least
where the pregnancy is a result of rape or otherwise involuntary. She then went on
to discuss the harder case of the woman impregnated against her will, or at least
against her desire, not because of rape but because of the failure of birth control.
Twenty-five years later, Professor Eileen McDonagh argued that the pregnant
woman’s dilemma, at least where her life is endangered by a pregnancy, is best
analogized to someone undergoing a life-threatening assault by an incompetent
but powerful born individual, even if that individual was consensually conceived
and raised by the victim him or herself, and as we should all agree that such a
person would have a right to defend himself even with lethal force against the
latter, we should agree that the woman whose life is threatened by a pregnancy
would likewise be entitled to defend herself against the fetus by procuring an
abortion—even if the pregnancy and conception were consensual.9 She then goes
on to discuss the harder case of the woman who is pregnant and whose wellbeing
rather than life are threatened by the pregnancy. On the other side, numerous
theorists from a range of disciplines have argued that as we all agree that no parent
is entitled to commit infanticide, no matter what the reason, we should agree
that late-term abortions are likewise morally forbidden, and ought to be legally
forbidden as well. Constitutional arguments both inside and outside the courts
have the same structure. The first premise states the common ground—a statutory
or constitutional text, or a controlling precedent—on which we all stand. The
advocate then argues toward a contentious conclusion which, the lawyer believes,
the other side will be forced to accept if the argument is sound.
If this is what is meant by common ground, it’s fair to say that common ground
projects in the abortion wars have not been demonstrably successful. Thomson’s
argument most strongly justifies abortion in the case of rape, and McDonagh’s
in the case of life-threatening pregnancies, yet the Republican Party Platform,
as it has for the past 20 years, makes no exceptions in its proposed ban on all
abortions, for women pregnant as a result of rape, or for women whose lives are
endangered by their pregnancies. More generally, the “common premises” are
losing their commonality: it is now clearer than it might have been 20 years ago
that politically powerful actors within the larger American society, such as the
organized Catholic Church, do not share a belief in the moral permissibility of
any form of artificial birth control, or that any publicly backed healthcare plan
should facilitate its use, whether or not a state could constitutionally criminalize
the practice. It is equally clear that large numbers of Americans do not believe that
late-term abortions, particularly when indicated by fatal birth defects or maternal
9 Eileen McDonagh, Breaking
Consent 7 (1996).

the

Abortion Deadlock: From Choice
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health, raise insurmountable moral issues. And, although there may be wide
agreement that infanticide is and should be criminalized comparably to homicide,
except in cases of severely mitigating circumstances, there is no movement within
pro-choice activism toward making similar concessions for late-term abortion,
whatever the reason for the abortion. While pro-choice activists may individually
find some abortions immoral, such as abortions of pregnancies brought on by the
reckless failure to use available birth control, there is also no movement toward any
compromise view that would permit or advise the criminality of some abortions,
but not others, on the basis of the motives of the woman seeking to obtain it.
What might be concluded from this history of failure, in a quest toward common
ground? One possibility of course is that the arguments that will eventually
successfully convince skeptical listeners simply have not yet been uncovered:
perhaps with just a bit more litigation, scholarship, study, or argument, we can
still yet societally uncover the truth of the matter regarding the constitutionality
or wisdom of anti-abortion laws, or the morality of various abortions in various
circumstances. It may be that the best, and yet undiscovered, argument will
convince those otherwise not inclined to agree that the Constitution, properly read,
really does prohibit bans on abortions like the ones contained in the Republican
Party Platform, or that, properly read, the Constitution protects the right to life of
the fetus, thereby mandating fetal protection laws, or that the Constitution in fact
is silent on the issue, as Robert Bork argued some years ago, leaving the issue
to be resolved in the political realm. Likewise it may be that the best and yet
undiscovered argument will convince the currently unconvinced that abortions in
all or most circumstances are inexcusably and nonjustifiably homicidal, other than
those obtained in genuine defense of the mother’s life, or perhaps the best and yet
undiscovered argument will convince those not inclined to agree that most or all
abortions, particularly early term, are in fact morally unproblematic. The existence
of these live possibilities is what keeps research, litigation, and argument over the
wisdom, morality, criminality, and constitutionality of abortion and abortion laws
something other than a massive waste of social and material capital.
On the other hand, it may be that the failure to achieve any progress, on this
understanding of the “common ground” argument, follows from a deeper cause, and
that is the foundational incompatibility of values and worldviews of antagonists on
either side, making “shared ground” illusory and the shared ground project a fool’s
errand. As Kristin Luker demonstrated 30 years ago,10 the differences between
pro-choice activists and pro-life activists even at that relatively early stage of this
evolution are so profound, it’s not at all clear that shared premises and sound
logic will ever bring them together. The differing views on abortion have little
to do with unsound argument, and much to do with foundational understandings
of the role of choice, rather than God’s will, in women’s lives, the importance of
“planning” to a well lived life, and the meaning of responsibility, intimacy, and
care, in the context of parental and marital relationships: thus, to take just two

10 Kristin Luker, Abortion & The Politics of Motherhood (1984).
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examples, pro-life activists, particularly the leadership, view the exalted role of
“choice” in not just pro-choice but all liberal worldviews as an arrogant usurpation
of authority over profoundly religious questions regarding the nature of the good
life, while liberals and choice activists view the failure to plan one’s parenthood
as tantamount to grotesque irresponsibility; pro-life activists and leaders view the
openness to the creation of new life in the context of a marital relationship as
the quintessence of the meaning of sexuality, while liberals view the meaning of
sexuality as only contingently related to procreation in any guise. In the last 30
years, these quite fundamental commitments on both sides seem to have deepened,
rather than weakened, in the face of the political wars over abortion. The search
for common ground as a consequence looks more and more like a mirage.
There is, however, a different possible understanding of “common ground”
and “common ground” projects, that might be more in keeping with President
Obama’s invocation of the phrase in his famous Notre Dame speech from the
beginning of his first term several years ago,11 and more in keeping with the spirit
of most of the contributions to this volume. “Common ground” might refer not to
shared premises, from which agreement might or might not follow on the more
divisive points, but rather, shared political or intellectual projects, grounded in
values that might be shared or congruent, but then again might not be, and with no
aim of moving from that shared ground toward agreement on either the morality
or criminality of abortions, or the constitutionality of anti-abortion bans. This
understanding of “common ground” is more closely connected to ordinary coalition
building in ordinary politics, than to forms of argument in academic philosophy
or even law: the point of “common ground projects” on this understanding is not
to compel agreement to conclusions from the logical force of an argument based
on shared premises, but rather, to encourage cooperation on projects that may be
grounded in differing worldviews, and with no aim of reconciling those views, or
forging a convergence between them. On this understanding of “common ground,”
there is no need to identify starting premises that are agreed upon, but rather, there
is a need to identify projects that might be viewed as imperative, or desirable, by
both sides. Therefore, the possibility, quite real in the context of abortion debates,
that pro-life and pro-choice advocates operate on the basis of radically conflicting
values and worldviews, is not fatal to the possibility of common ground. Those
with radically different worldviews might nevertheless have overlapping goals.
Working toward them, whatever the starting points of advocates, might then create
common ground of the more conventional sort: it might reveal shared values, and
forge more commonality than had been previously perceived.
In his contribution to this joint introduction, my co-editor Justin Murray
suggests one possible shared project that might create common ground in this way:
both pro-life and pro-choice forces, he argues, should have an interest in reducing
11 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President of the United States in
Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame (May 17, 2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-notre-dame-commencement.
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the incidence of unwanted abortions, or at least, those unwanted abortions which
are sought because of the cost of mothering. Both sides then should have an
interest in reducing maternal costs, including the costs of pregnancy, childbirth,
and parenting. Many abortions in this country are sought for economic reasons:
a family or a mother cannot afford another child, and despairs of the prospect
of bringing a child into the world in poverty, and which she cannot support.
A stronger safety net for new mothers or new parents, and particularly publicly
available and high quality childcare for toddlers and pre-schoolers, would go a
long way toward reducing the demand for abortion. This result should be not only
acceptable but worth fighting for, for both pro-life and pro-choice activists: on the
pro-life side, because it brings the abortion rate down, and on the pro-choice (or
loosely feminist groups) side, because it would enhance the life prospects of poor
women who want to be or are mothers, as well as the quality of their parenting.
The goal of reducing such pregnancies should be a common goal of both sides, and
pursuing it could quite conceivably broaden the common ground beneath them: it
would strengthen the commitment of both to the work of improving the lives of
poor people, and align their joint interests with a vulnerable people.
Let me add another example. Pro-life and Pro-choice activists might also have a
shared commitment to the goal of reducing the incidence of unwanted pregnancies,
whether caused by rape, by unwanted but consensual intercourse, or by desired
intercourse and a failure of birth control. Some of these unwanted pregnancies, of
course, are then ended by abortions. From the pro-life perspective, the abortion
that is chosen to end an unwanted pregnancy has many of the same harms and
costs regardless of the reason for the pregnancy: the abortion that terminates a
pregnancy may cause fetal pain, end a human life or a potential human life, and
degrade and coarsen our cultural commitment to the value of life regardless of
whether the pregnancy is the result of failed birth control, unwanted sex, or rape.
It would be better, surely, to have the conception not occur, than to have it occur
and the resulting pregnancy aborted. Presumably, then, pro-life activists (or at
least some) should be committed to bringing down the number of such unwanted
pregnancies, whether caused by rape, unwanted sex, or the unavailability or failure
of reliable birth control. From a pro-choice perspective, an unwanted pregnancy is
an infringement on a woman’s autonomy and physical integrity: it is the use of her
body by the fetus and, if caused by rape, by a man against her desires and against
her will. If we could reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies, we would not
only bring down the abortion rate, we might also boost women’s autonomy, sense
of self-sovereignty, and physical integrity.
But not only the unwanted pregnancy, but also the causes of those pregnancy
might be independent harms. The unwanted pregnancy might be the result of
rape, in which case it is and represents an assault on her physical sovereignty
over her own body. Less remarked upon, though, unwanted pregnancies might
also be the result of unwanted, albeit consensual, sex. Unwanted, but consensual,
sex does not carry the harms of rape, but it does carry its own harms: it represents
a degradation of a woman’s (or girl’s) sense of self-possession, autonomy, and
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physical sovereignty. A woman who is engaging in sex that she does not physically
desire is alienating herself from her body and its pleasures: she is putting her body
to the use of another, for his pleasures rather than hers, and on the basis of his
desires rather than her own. If she becomes pregnant in the process, then she will
eventually alienate her body likewise to the needs of the fetus growing inside her.
Pro-choice activists, and feminists generally, and I would urge all the rest of us as
well, should have an interest in preventing the unwanted sex, even if it is short of
rape, that might in turn lead to unwanted pregnancies. That unwanted sex has costs
and harms of its own that go to the core of female autonomy, agency, and pleasure:
the sex can be painful, it is an alienation of one’s body and one’s power over one’s
body and pleasures, and it renders one’s own hedonic life subservient to that of
another. Sex, even if consensual, that is contrary to one’s own desires, creates a
gap between one’s decisions and actions on the one hand, and the teaching of one’s
own body on the other.
Both sides, then, should be committed for different although likely overlapping
reasons to empowering women and girls to definitively resist sex that they do
not themselves physically desire. Doing so would bring down the numbers of
unwanted pregnancies and hence the abortion rate. Doing so would also, though,
bring down a form of invasion of women’s bodies—the sex, as well as the
pregnancy—that carries real harms of its own: it infringes women’s autonomy,
self-respect, physical self-possession, and hedonic awareness.
Lastly, some unwanted pregnancies are the result of birth control, but perhaps a
greater number are the result of the failure to use birth control responsibly. It would
seem, then, that anyone committed to the project of bringing down the numbers
of abortion might be interested in an attempt to articulate, and then instill, a moral
duty incumbent upon sexual partners to use birth control, wherever unprotected
sex carries the risk of pregnancy: from both perspectives, it brings down the role of
unwanted pregnancies, which are properly regarded by both as harmful. It is odd,
then, that there has been so little movement on either side toward the articulation
of a duty, incumbent upon sexual partners whose unprotected sex might lead to
an unwanted pregnancy, to use birth control responsibly. Yet, this hasn’t occurred:
some, although certainly not all, pro-life activists are opposed on moral grounds
to the use of birth control, and pro-choice activists have been absorbed by the
recurrent and recurrently difficult and consuming work of defending the right to
use birth control rather than the duty to do so.
Nevertheless, and as I will argue in my contribution to this volume, it seems
to me that this is fertile territory for common ground and for a common ground
project. Although some pro-life activists oppose the use of birth control, not all
do by any means: many pro-life activists, particularly among the rank and file
rather than the leadership, are opposed to abortion because of the pain caused
the fetus, the humanity of fetal life, and the degradation to the culture by virtue
of the easy availability of the abortion procedure. They do not necessarily share
the antipathy to birth control. And, while pro-choice activists have been absorbed
in the work of defending the right to use birth control, there is no incongruity
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between insisting upon that right, and at the same time insisting upon the existence
of a duty to do so. Yes, women and girls as well as men should have a right to the
birth control that allows them control over their destiny, at least as that destiny
involves the decisions whether and when to parent. They should also be able to
choose to enjoy a full and active sexual life, regardless of their decision regarding
parenting, and they should have access to the birth control that will permit them to
do so. But it should also be incumbent upon them, should they so choose, to do so
in a responsible manner that does not risk an unwanted pregnancy.
I would suggest that pro-choice and pro-life activists could embark upon not
only a common project of preventing unwanted abortions, as Justin argues, but
also a common project of bringing down the incidence of unwanted pregnancies,
or perhaps for the sake of clarity, unwanted conception, not only by resisting rape
and rape culture, but also by encouraging girls and women to resist unwanted sex,
and by articulating the grounds of a duty shared by sexual partners, when engaging
in wanted sex, to use birth control so as to prevent the unwanted pregnancies that
might ensue.
There are of course other possible common ground projects, some of which are
elucidated by contributors to this volume. I argue in my contribution that one of the
costs of constitutionalizing these issues, beginning with Roe v. Wade through to the
present, is that it makes these projects harder: it hardens conceptions of identity,
aligning one with the peculiar and peculiarly non-political voice of national
identity, articulated by the undemocratic Supreme Court, and that is an unfortunate
side effect (among others) of the institution of judicial review. Adjudication has
the effect of articulating contrasting worldviews, and pronouncing one of them
consistent with a deep American constitutional identity—not conducive to the
project of coalition politics. But we’ve lived with this reality now for 40 years.
Perhaps within the next decade we will discover a way to re-engage in ordinary
political work in spite of it. Pro-life and pro-choice leaders could from time to
time drop their identification with a political movement based on a view of life’s
meaning that is inconsistent with that of so many of their co-citizens, and could
again become ordinary citizens in a common project of nation-building through
the ordinary means of persuasion and politics, all with an eye toward improving
the quality of the lives, and the quality of parenting, of men and women, whatever
might be their understanding of the morality of abortion, and the constitutionality
of laws that regulate it. By engaging in common projects, they would undoubtedly
find much common ground between them as well.
The Chapters
One of the primary questions that emerged during our collaboration was whether
the predominantly constitutional and legal focus of the current debate about
abortion has narrowed and constricted the rhetoric and aspirations of both the
pro-life and pro-choice movements. That question is the focus of Robin West’s
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chapter, which argues that the right to abortion as constitutionalized in Roe v. Wade
is fundamentally a negative right that strives to keep the state out of the domain of
family life. By equating reproductive justice with a right to terminate a pregnancy,
the decision legitimates a minimalist state response to the challenges faced by
pregnant women who carry their pregnancies to term and low-income parents who
might need greater public support. West’s chapter also explores some of the gains
that might come from returning the struggles over abortion to ordinary democratic
politics, including: facilitating common ground efforts, achieving more durable
political compromises, and strengthening the role of moral restraints in bringing
down the need for and rate of abortion.
The central conviction that animates most of the chapters in this book is that
there are plenty of fruitful areas for political and cultural collaboration on abortion
and reproductive justice, many of which have escaped notice because they do not
conform to the adversarial parameters of the traditional abortion dialogue. Shari
Motro’s chapter addresses a set of problems that fits this description. She explains
that laws relating to pregnancy among unmarried lovers presume that nonmarital
sex happens between strangers and comes with no strings attached. These laws
therefore treat unmarried women as the sole decision-makers regarding whether
to abort or proceed with a pregnancy, and also as the appropriate party to bear
the extensive costs associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Motro criticizes the
foundational assumption and inequitable results of this legal regime and proposes
a system in which men would be more involved not only in the choice of whether
to proceed with an out-of-wedlock pregnancy, but also in bearing the costs of
that choice.
In a similar vein, Shauna Prewitt’s chapter aims to resolve a problem that ought
to be of common concern to proponents of choice as well as opponents of abortion.
She explains that women who conceive through rape and opt to give birth are
treated as imposters, not genuine rape victims, because entrenched social and legal
norms—particularly those reflected in current abortion laws—expect that true
rape victims will inevitably abort those pregnancies. Due to this misimpression,
current laws fail to protect women who bear rape-related pregnancies to term when
the rapists attempt to gain custody or visitation rights for the children. Prewitt
cogently argues that all sides in the abortion debate have a common interest in
reforming these laws to ensure that women impregnated by rape have a genuine
choice whether to give birth or terminate the pregnancy.
Many promising avenues for common ground seek to further the principles of
human dignity and equality, principles shared by many participants in the abortion
dialogue. To that end, Dorothy Roberts’s chapter documents various ways in
which “[r]eproductive health policies have been shaped by … a striking race and
class hierarchy that values the childbearing of white and middle-class women
more highly than that of poor women and women of color.” In particular, she
criticizes eugenically inspired family-planning policies and demeaning cultural
messages—paired with criminal laws—targeting low-income black women who
use drugs during pregnancy. Likewise, Elizabeth Schiltz’s chapter problematizes
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the widely shared belief that an abortion of a disabled fetus is less morally troubling
than an abortion of a healthy one. In so doing, she explains how disabilityselective abortions perpetuate negative stereotypes about, and unequal treatment
of, individuals with disabilities. Both Roberts and Schiltz argue that whatever one
thinks about the proper legal status of abortion, our shared commitment to equality
warrants caution about reproductive practices and policies that reflect or foster
entrenched hierarchies and prejudices.
Because the opposing sides of the abortion debate are not internally
homogeneous but instead embrace a variety of groups, interests, and perspectives,
common ground depends in large measure on the depth and adaptability of these
diverse constituencies. The last two chapters in the collection discuss ways in
which two key players on the abortion issue—the Democrat Party and the
Catholic Church—might meaningfully further common ground efforts. Kristen
Day, the executive director of Democrats for Life, a Democrat-affiliated prolife organization, summarizes the progress her organization has made—and the
challenges it has faced—in promoting common ground within her party and
within the US Congress. Finally, Susan Stabile’s chapter proposes criteria to guide
committed Catholics in deciding what kinds of common ground to embrace: in her
view, a Catholic should consider not only whether an abortion-related policy is
consistent with Church teaching, but also whether it is politically viable and has a
realistic chance of reducing abortion rates. Applying these criteria, she argues that
Catholics may prioritize abortion-reduction strategies that involve expanding the
safety net for pregnant women over more traditional approaches that emphasize
legal restriction.
Together, these chapter merely scratch the surface of a burgeoning and exciting
area of scholarship, activism, and advocacy. We hope that this book helps foster a
more expansive and reflective dialogue about how to address abortion that builds
upon our shared convictions and commitments.
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